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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2010

Allocating power between courts and arbitrators  and why scholars of federal courts should
care
The Federal Arbitration Act makes arbitration agreements as enforceable as all other contracts. In April, the Supreme
Court will hear argument in RentACenter v. Jackson, which concerns the question of who  court or arbitrator 
decides a claim that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable and thus unenforceable. In this case, the arbitration
agreement itself assigns (or at least purports to assign) that power to the arbitrator. The Ninth Circuit, however, held
that unconscionability was an issue for the court. This case holds obvious interest for those who study ADR, consumer
law (most consumer contracts have arbitration clauses, whether or not you know it), and employment law (this case is
an employment discrimination suit). What I hope to show you is that it is just as interesting for those who study
federal courts and judicial politics. Beneath the surface, the case is, in a sense, more Bush v. Gore than Williams v.
WalkerThomas Furniture.
To see why the case is so intriguing, one has to appreciate what one might call its strategic context. The Supreme
Court is strongly proarbitration. Some state and federal courts are not quite so enthusiastic, at least when it comes to
consumer and employment contexts with their largely adhesionary contracts. (Please note that I'm not discussing
whether the Court's decisions in this area, and its broader proarbitration stance, reflect sound interpretations of the
relevant statute, good policy, etc.) Over the course of the last couple of decades the Supreme Court has shut off most
avenues for challenging arbitration agreements at the wholesale level  state law cannot declare particular fields like
consumer transactions off limits from arbitration, courts cannot deem arbitration per se violative of public policy, etc.
All such arguments are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. What remains, though, is the possibility for retail
level challenges to particular arbitration clauses under section 2 of the Act, which allows ordinary contract defenses
that would invalidate any contract. So arbitration itself cannot be questioned, but a particular arbitration clause might
be invalidated as the product of duress, fraud, etc.
In the last few years, as other routes for challenging arbitration have been closed off, unconscionability has become a
surprisingly common and surprisingly effective way of attacking arbitration agreements. The challenges do not attack
arbitration per se  federal law favors arbitration  but instead target various aspects of a particular arbitration process:
a given clause might forbid class arbitrations, bar punitive damages or otherwise restrict remedies, sharply curtail
discovery, require a consumer to pay hefty arbitrator's fees, etc. There have been many cases on these topics in recent
years, and a good number of them sustain the challenge to the arbitration clause.
These cases have generated lots of petitions for certiorari in which businesses, assisted by amici like the Chamber of
Commerce, charge that some state courts and lower federal courts are using unconscionability to discriminate against
arbitration in violation of federal law. That is, while ordinary contract defenses can be used to invalidate an
arbitration clause, those doctrines are not supposed to be used differently in the arbitration context in order to
disadvantage arbitration. Perhaps surprisingly, given its proarbitration stance, the Supreme Court has for years let
these petitions go by. My suspicion is that the Court has avoided these cases because it feels illequipped to resolve
whether a lower court is discriminating against arbitration. First, unconscionability analysis often requires a fact
intensive inquiry. Second, and more important, determining whether a lower court is using unconscionability
differently when it comes to arbitration requires an engagement with the details of state law and a comparison of lots
of prior unconscionability cases. Third, and maybe most important of all, a holding that the lower court is applying
unconscionability unfairly, especially when the lower court says it is applying the same analysis it applies
elsewhere, carries with it some serious expressive baggage. Essentially, it requires the Supreme Court to say that the
lower court is being dishonest. That happens, but when it does so, it is a big deal (think cases like Bush v. Gore or the
cases from the 50s/60s rejecting supposed procedural defaults in the state courts).
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The nice thing about a case like RentACenter v. Jackson, at least from the point of view of a proarbitration court, is
that it concerns not the merits of an unconscionability challenge but instead the allocation question  a question
of who decides. That doesn't require diving into the weeds of state law and the record. If the Court assigns the issue to
the arbitrator, that will be a very easy rule to monitor for compliance (unlike deciding whether the lower court applied
unconscionability correctly). All of those unconscionability cases out there will instantly become not wrong
but irrelevant  because courts won't be deciding the issue anymore. And it won't matter whether some lower courts
can be trusted to apply unconscionability correctly, because they will be cut out of the picture.
All of the analysis above suggests reasons why the Supreme Court would find it useful to assign unconscionability to
the arbitrator. On the other side, there are some reasons for it not to do that. Notably, it might be that judicial review
for unconscionability operates as a sort of safety valve that makes arbitration of consumer and employment disputes
palatable.
If you find this line of argument compelling, or at least interesting, I explore it in an NYU Law Review article
available here. A much shorter and more accessible version is available here.
To this point I haven't said anything about the more narrowly doctrinal aspects of the case. I think that, as with many
cases that reach the Supreme Court, the conventionally authoritative legal materials leave enough room here that
acceptable legal reasoning could get you to either result. In brief (and this compressed summary probably won't make
sense to nonspecialists): On Jackson's side, one might say, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the Prima Paintseparability
doctrine does not apply here because this is a challenge specifically to an agreement to arbitrate. (Indeed, this was a
standalone arbitration agreement, not a larger contract that included an arbitration clause.) On the other side, I can
imagine RentACenter arguing that there is a separable agreement to arbitrate here. After all, the agreement to
arbitrate is not itself unconscionable  it can't be. Rather, the problem is the limitations on remedies and so forth. So
one could imagine that there is an underlying theoretical agreement to arbitrate that remains uninfected, and then
Jackson is supposed to go to arbitration to try to get the arbitrator to invalidate the offensive restrictions. That would
be slicing separability pretty thinly, of course.
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